SOURCE 0 - MICA VOCABULARY
Author: Jean-François ELSEN (Senior Forensic Auditor · Judicial Specialist in Digital Evidence · DGSA)
Location: Brussels – Charleroi, Belgium
Organization: Jean-François ELSEN · jfelsen.com
Classification: Authoritative Public Release · July 2026
Audience: C-Suite Executives, Boards of Directors, Regulators, Supervisory Authorities, Legal Departments, CISOs, Compliance Officers, AI Governance Architects, Forensic Analysts, Critical Infrastructure Operators, Public Authorities
Series: SOURCE 0 Doctrine Series
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Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) imposes recurring obligations on issuers of crypto-assets, issuers of asset-referenced tokens, issuers of e-money tokens, and crypto-asset service providers: white paper notification and publication, reserve-of-assets composition and custody, conflicts-of-interest disclosure, client-asset safekeeping, inside-information disclosure, and market-abuse prevention. Each obligation produces an internal record. None of these records, on their own, prove the moment the underlying act occurred, independently of the party that produced them. SOURCE 0 seals the relevant document or state at T-0 and deposits it independently before a huissier de justice belge, establishing date certaine under Book 8 of the Belgian new Civil Code.
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1 - Was the published white paper the same one notified to regulators?
Article 8(1) and (5) of MiCA require the white paper to be notified to the competent authority of the home Member State at least 20 working days before publication. Article 9(2) then requires the published version to be identical to the version notified. Both dates and both versions are self-produced and self-compared by the offeror; nothing external fixes the notified version at the moment it was sent. SOURCE 0 seals the notified white paper at T-0, independently of the offeror, so that the published version can be checked against a fixed reference rather than against the offeror's own file.
2 - Was a white paper change notified before it was published?
Article 12(2) requires a modified white paper, together with the reasons for the modification, to be notified to the competent authority at least seven working days before publication. The notification date is generated by the same party that decided the modification was needed. SOURCE 0 seals the modified white paper and the stated reasons for the modification at T-0, fixing the sequence independently of the offeror's own notification record.
3 - Did the marketing match the white paper at the time?
Article 7(1)(c) requires marketing communications to be consistent with the crypto-asset white paper. Consistency is normally checked after the fact, against whichever version of the white paper the offeror produces at that point, which may not be the version that was actually in force when the communication was issued. SOURCE 0 seals the marketing communication together with the white paper version in force at T-0, fixing the pairing the offeror will later be asked to justify.
4 - Was the climate disclosure in the white paper before launch?
Article 6(1)(j) requires the white paper to disclose the principal adverse impacts on the climate and other environment-related impacts of the consensus mechanism used to issue the crypto-asset. This disclosure sits inside the same self-produced document as the rest of the white paper and carries no independent proof of when it was finalised. SOURCE 0 seals the complete white paper, including this disclosure, at T-0.
5 - Was due diligence done before listing a token?
Article 76(1)(a) requires operating rules for a trading platform to set customer due-diligence procedures, commensurate to money-laundering and terrorist-financing risk, applied before admission to trading. The due-diligence assessment is an internal file the operator can revise at will after the fact. SOURCE 0 seals the completed due-diligence assessment at T-0, before the crypto-asset is admitted to trading.
6 - Did the reserve actually cover the risk on a given day?
Article 36 requires the reserve of assets to be composed and managed so that the risks associated with the referenced assets are covered and the liquidity risk of redemption is addressed, at all times. A reserve valuation produced after the fact cannot establish what the composition was at a prior instant. SOURCE 0 seals the reserve composition and its valuation at T-0, independently of the issuer.
7 - Were the reserve assets free of any encumbrance?
Article 37(1) requires reserve assets to be free of any encumbrance or pledge and held in custody so that the issuer has prompt access to meet redemption requests. The custody record is produced and controlled by the issuer or its custodian. SOURCE 0 seals the custody state of the reserve assets at T-0, fixing it independently of the party that holds them.
8 - Did the reserve investment meet the risk criteria at the time?
Article 38(1) restricts investment of the reserve to highly liquid financial instruments with minimal market, credit and concentration risk. Whether a given instrument met that criterion is assessed by reference to conditions at the time of investment, which the issuer alone records. SOURCE 0 seals the investment decision and the criteria relied upon at T-0.
9 - Was a redemption request handled under the policy in force?
Article 39 gives holders of asset-referenced tokens a permanent right of redemption and requires issuers to apply a policy covering conditions, mechanisms and procedures. Whether a specific request was processed according to that policy, or according to a version altered afterward, is provable only from the issuer's own file. SOURCE 0 seals the redemption policy in force and the redemption event itself, each at its own T-0.
10 - Did the recovery plan exist before the stress event?
Article 46(1) requires an issuer to draw up and maintain a recovery plan providing for measures to restore compliance with reserve requirements. A recovery plan produced or revised after a stress event begins is indistinguishable, on the issuer's own record, from one that predated it. SOURCE 0 seals the recovery plan at T-0, fixing it before any stress event it is later invoked against.
11 - Was the conflict of interest disclosed before the trade?
Article 72 requires crypto-asset service providers to identify, prevent, manage and disclose conflicts of interest, with disclosure available in a prominent place before the client takes an informed decision. The disclosure text on a website can be edited retroactively with no visible trace of what was shown on a given date. SOURCE 0 seals the conflicts-of-interest disclosure in force at T-0, before the transaction it is meant to inform.
12 - Were client assets segregated at that moment?
Article 70 requires arrangements to safeguard client ownership rights, in particular in the event of the provider's insolvency, and requires client funds to be placed with a credit institution or central bank by the end of the following business day. The segregation record is produced and can be altered by the same provider whose insolvency it is meant to protect against. SOURCE 0 seals the segregation state at T-0, independently of the provider.
13 - Was the complaint handled under the procedure in force?
Article 71 requires crypto-asset service providers to establish, publish and apply effective complaints-handling procedures, and to keep a record of complaints and the measures taken. The published procedure and the complaint record are both controlled by the same party being complained against. SOURCE 0 seals the complaints-handling procedure in force and each complaint record at T-0.
14 - Did the provider actually oversee the outsourced function?
Article 73(1) requires providers that outsource operational functions to remain fully responsible for their obligations and to retain the expertise and resources necessary to evaluate the outsourced service. Evaluations of an outsourced provider are typically produced only when a dispute arises, by the party whose oversight is in question. SOURCE 0 seals the oversight assessment at T-0, at the time it was actually performed.
15 - Did the wind-down plan exist before the wind-down began?
Article 74 requires crypto-asset service providers offering custody, trading, exchange, placing or order-execution services to maintain a plan supporting an orderly wind-down, drawn up in advance of any actual event triggering it. A wind-down plan produced or amended once wind-down has already begun cannot be distinguished, on the provider's own file, from one drafted beforehand. SOURCE 0 seals the wind-down plan at T-0.
16 - Was the risk warning given before the trade?
Article 66(3) requires providers to warn clients of the risks associated with transactions in crypto-assets. Whether a specific warning was shown to a specific client before, rather than after, a transaction depends on a log the provider itself generates and controls. SOURCE 0 seals the risk-warning content and its delivery event at T-0, ahead of the transaction it accompanies.
17 - Was suitability assessed before the advice was given?
Article 81(1) requires providers offering advice or portfolio management on crypto-assets to assess whether the service is suitable for the client, taking into account knowledge, experience, investment objectives and capacity to bear losses. The suitability assessment is an internal document the provider can complete or amend after the advice was already given. SOURCE 0 seals the suitability assessment at T-0, before the advice or the portfolio decision it is meant to justify.
18 - Was inside information disclosed as soon as possible?
Article 88(1) requires issuers, offerors and persons seeking admission to trading to inform the public of inside information as soon as possible. Article 88(3) allows a self-assessed delay, subject only to the issuer's own justification to the competent authority. Both the moment the information became known internally and the moment of disclosure are set exclusively by the party being assessed. SOURCE 0 seals the moment inside information is identified internally at T-0, fixing the starting point of a clock the issuer alone would otherwise control.
19 - Were market-abuse controls in place before the incident?
Article 92(1) requires effective arrangements, systems and procedures to prevent and detect market abuse, and imposes a duty to report suspicion without delay. Whether those arrangements existed, and in what form, before a given suspicious transaction is provable only from the operator's own records. SOURCE 0 seals the arrangements, systems and procedures in force at T-0, independently of the operator whose diligence they are meant to evidence.
20 - Was best execution applied at the moment of the trade?
Article 78(1) requires providers executing orders on behalf of clients to take all necessary steps to obtain the best possible result, considering price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size and nature of the order. The execution policy referred to when a dispute arises is the version the provider currently holds, not necessarily the version in force at the time of execution. SOURCE 0 seals the execution policy and the specific execution event, each at its own T-0.
21 - Was the custody agreement in force when assets were accepted?
Article 75(1) requires an agreement specifying the custody policy, communication means, security systems and fees applicable to the safekeeping of a client's crypto-assets. A provider holding both the agreement and the register of positions can amend either without leaving an independently verifiable trace of the version in force when the client's assets were first accepted. SOURCE 0 seals the agreement and the client's position record at T-0.
22 - Was the e-money token issued and redeemed at par value?
Article 49(3) requires e-money tokens to be issued at par value on receipt of funds; Article 49(4) requires redemption at par value, at any time, on the holder's request. Whether a specific issuance or a specific redemption respected par value is checked against the issuer's own transaction record. SOURCE 0 seals the issuance event and the redemption event, each at its own T-0, fixing the amounts independently of the issuer.
23 - What did the e-money token white paper actually say?
Article 52(3) places the burden on the holder to show the issuer's white paper, or a modified version of it, was not complete, fair or clear, or was misleading. Proving what the white paper actually said at the time of the holder's purchase, sale or exchange decision requires a version fixed independently of the issuer, who alone controls the current copy on file. SOURCE 0 seals each version of the e-money token white paper at T-0, at the moment it was given to the public.
24 - Was the recovery plan notified within six months?
Article 55 applies Title III, Chapter 6 to e-money token issuers by derogation, requiring the recovery plan and the redemption plan to be notified to the competent authority within six months of the offer to the public or admission to trading. Whether notification actually occurred within that window is provable only from the issuer's own notification record. SOURCE 0 seals both plans at T-0, at the moment they were completed and notified.
25 - Did the provider respond fully to the regulator's request?
Article 94(1)(a) empowers competent authorities to require any person to provide information and documents relevant to their supervisory duties. What was actually produced, and when, in response to such a request is recorded solely by the provider that received it. SOURCE 0 seals the response package at T-0, at the moment it was assembled and transmitted.
26 - Was the report filed before the retaliation?
Article 116 applies Directive (EU) 2019/1937 to the reporting of infringements of MiCA and to the protection of reporting persons. Whether a report predates an adverse measure taken against its author is normally provable only from the employer's own HR and case files, controlled by the party the report concerns. SOURCE 0 seals the report at T-0, independently of the party it is reported against.
27 - Did the CASP's authorisation fall within the transitional window?
Article 143(3) allowed crypto-asset service providers already operating under prior national law to continue doing so only until 1 July 2026, or until an authorisation under Article 63 was granted or refused, whichever came first. Whether a given provider's activity, or the timing of its authorisation decision, actually fell within that window is a question the provider's own record answers unilaterally. SOURCE 0 seals the relevant activity or decision at T-0, fixing it against the closed transitional deadline independently of the provider.
CLOSING AXIOM
The law does not require material truth. It requires proof of diligence. SOURCE 0 seals that diligence.
REFERENCE NOTE
SOURCE 0 is a proprietary pre-execution cryptographic attestation architecture developed and operated by Jean-François ELSEN. Registered as a Benelux trademark (BOIP/OBPI n° 1548293, filed 6 May 2026, classes 35, 42 and 45). This article references Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on Markets in Crypto-Assets, verified directly against the consolidated Official Journal text (L 150, 9 June 2023).
REGULATORY NOTICE
This publication is provided for general information purposes and does not constitute legal advice. It does not create an advisory relationship between the reader and Jean-François ELSEN. Organisations subject to Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 should seek independent legal counsel for their specific circumstances.
